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Sympathy, Tragedy, and the Morality of Sentiment in Lessing’s Laocoon 
Katherine Harloe, University of Reading, UK 
In the course of his discussion of Sophocles’ Philoctetes in Laocoon, Chapter 4, Lessing takes issue 
with some comments of Adam Smith concerning humans’ capacity to sympathize with others’ 
physical pain. Although Lessing disagrees with Smith, their views have more in common than at 
first appears. Lessing’s recourse to Smith has not received as much attention within discussions 
of his ideas about pity (‘Mitleid’) as has his reading of other philosophers in the Anglophone 
sentimentalist tradition, such as Shaftesbury or Hutcheson; nor has the relation of Lessingian 
‘Mitleid’ to Smithian ‘sympathy’ attracted as much commentary as, say, its relation to Rousseau.1 
My primary purpose in this paper is not to contribute to the intellectual–historical debate over 
the influence of other European thinkers on Lessing’s psychological and ethical thought. It is to 
argue that the intrusion of Adam Smith into Laocoon’s early chapters is revelatory of a twin set of 
concerns: with the character of dramatic poetry and with its emotional and ethical effects, which 
are seldom expressed explicitly in the course of Lessing’s essay but which nevertheless pervade 
that work.  
These themes are little discussed in the scholarly commentary on Laocoon, since Lessing’s essay 
has been received canonically as an argument for autonomy of the arts from moral considerations. 
It has also been suggested that drama plays surprisingly little role in Laocoon as we have it.2 Yet 
the paratextual material suggest that thoughts about tragedy, and especially about tragic pity, 
provided both the seed, as well as the intended summation, of Lessing’s essay on the distinction 
between the arts. It was in all likelihood Moses Mendelssohn who first brought Winckelmann’s 
moralising interpretation of Laocoon’s suppressed screams to Lessing’s attention in the context 
of their mid-1750s debates about whether pity or moral admiration (‘Bewunderung’) is the 
proper end of tragedy.3 An oft-quoted letter of 1769 to Friedrich Nicolai shows the direction in 
which Lessing planned to develop Laocoon’s distinction between natural and arbitrary signs, 
projecting a ‘third part’ which would argue for drama’s superiority on the basis of its ability to 
convert the arbitrary signs deployed by other poetic genres into ‘natural signs of arbitrary things’.4  
Chapters 1–4 are where drama intrudes most obviously into the Laocoon as we have it; I shall 
suggest that the arguments Lessing levies against Smith provide a bridge between the Laocoon and 
Lessing’s earlier and later musings on tragic pity.  
In doing so, they also connect the famous formal and semiotic distinctions Lessing presents at 
the heart this text to his ongoing concern with (tragic) dramaturgy. Reconstructing the tragic 
framing of Lessing’s arguments about the provinces of painting and poetry has the potential to 
illuminate those arguments in ways sometimes overlooked by commentators who have treated 
                                                          
1 Exceptions are Heidsieck 1983 and Vogl 2004. On Lessing’s reading of Hutcheson and Shaftesbury see Nisbet 
1993. The influence of Rousseau on Lessing’s thoughts about pity is much debated. See in particular Schings 1980, 
Michelsen 1990: 107–36. On Lessing’s overall understanding of pity in the context of his dramatic theory see 
especially Martinec 2003, 2006; Tucci 2005. 
2 Gombrich 1957: 141–2; Nisbet 2013: 325. 
3 Mendelssohn to Lessing, December 1756; in Lessing 1972: 69–75, 73. For more on this correspondence, known to 
scholarship as the Briefwechsel über das Trauerspiel, see section I below.  
4 Lessing to Nicolai, 26 May 1769; in Lessing 1987: 608–11. English translation in Nisbet 1985: 133–4. See Beiser 
2011: 276–7 and Beiser’s chapter in this book. 
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them in the manner of a free–floating, philosophical discussion. While it has been noted that the 
distinctions Lessing draws between the objects (bodies v. actions) and media (natural v. arbitrary 
signs) of painting and poetry are framed by the fundamental principle that illusion is the goal of 
the arts, it is appreciated less frequently that by time Lessing came to draft his essay in the early 
1760s, illusion had become an established topic of debate in dramatic theory, which itself drew 
upon a longer tradition of discussion in the visual arts.5 Lessing was fully versed in the writings 
of Francophone authors such as Fénelon and Diderot, who had turned to Greek tragedy in the 
course of propounding a new and more naturalistic theatrical code. The model of Sophocles in 
particular was often advanced in these debates as the antithesis to the highly conventionalised, 
‘classical’ French tragedies of the siècle de Louis le Grand. Far from constituting the 
unacknowledged frame of the classical view of representation, the question of illusion was 
vigorously debated in Lessing’s own generation, precisely in the context of tragic drama.  
If these debates form the background to Lessing’s invocation of Philoctetes in Laocoon, his turn to 
Smith reveals how far his concern to distinguish between the arts is ethically laced. For Lessing’s 
defence of Sophocles against Smith is not achieved primarily on the grounds of his tragedies’ 
alleged naturalism of language and character, but on the basis of their emotional effect: namely, 
their success at arousing pity in their audience.  Pity is, moreover, understood by both Lessing 
and Smith as a quintessentially moral and social emotion.6 Despite its abstractions and 
appearance of l’art pour l’art, ethical and social concern still underlies Laocoon.   
Finally, throughout all these debates and concerns we may detect the ‘classical presence’ of 
Aristotle, whose poetic categories – albeit transformed – continued to play an authoritative role 
in the dramatic theorising of Lessing’s day. Concerns with ‘illusion’ and ‘sympathy’ trace their 
genealogies back to the Aristotelian categories of ‘mimesis’ and ‘pity’, and eighteenth–century 
criticisms of critical categories such as the three unities are disagreements over the interpretation 
of Aristotle as often as they are attempts to move beyond him.7  Lessing’s desire to found his 
views about the character and purpose of tragic drama on the Poetics is explicit in the 1756–7 
correspondence on tragedy and the 1767–9 Hamburgische Dramaturgie. Although implicit, it is 
nonetheless present in Laocoon.  
LAOCOON 1–4 AND THE TURN TO SOPHOCLES 
Let us begin by examining the train of argument that leads Lessing to cite Smith. The discussion 
comes in the course of Laocoon, Chapter 4’s consideration of the propriety of poetic depictions of 
bodily pain. Lessing has already defended Virgil’s description of Laocoon’s screams in 
accordance with his developing theoretical distinctions: qua poet, Virgil is confined neither to 
depicting beauty nor to representing a single moment; his description of how the Trojan priest 
‘clamores horrendos ad sidera tollit’ is therefore immune from censure on these grounds. But 
Lessing goes on to concede that Virgil is ‘purely a narrative poet’. In the case of drama, a genre 
                                                          
5 On the importance of illusion see Giuliani 2003: 2; see too Wellbery 1984: 9–42 on the Enlightenment ideal of ‘a 
completely transparent language that is equivalent to divine cognition’ (42).  
6 Heidsieck 1983. 
7 Billings 2014: 19–44 provides an overview of French and German debates over tragedy from the late seventeenth 
to the mid–eighteenth century which emphasises the continuing importance of Aristotle.  
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of poetry destined to be turned by actors into a kind of ‘living painting’, do the restrictions he 
has identified for the visual arts still apply? 
It is here that Lessing turns to the Philoctetes:  
In it [drama] we do not merely make believe that we see or hear a screaming Philoctetes, 
we actually see and hear him. The closer the actor approaches nature the more our eyes 
and ears must be affronted; for it is an incontrovertible fact that they are affronted in 
nature itself when we perceive such loud and violent expressions of pain. Besides, we are 
generally unable to respond with the same degree of sympathy to physical pain as to 
other suffering. Our imagination can discern too little in such pain to allow the mere 
sight of it to arouse in us anything of a corresponding feeling. Consequently, Sophocles 
may easily have violated not a merely conventional sense of propriety, but one that is 
grounded in the very nature of our feelings, when he made Philoctetes and Hercules 
moan and weep, scream and howl to such a degree.8  
Lessing’s choice of the Philoctetes is appropriate, for it is a distinguishing feature of that tragedy 
that a great part of the hero’s suffering consists in physical torment. Sophocles’ treatment of the 
myth emphasises this element: Philoctetes’ groans of agony are first heard off-stage, and 
although Heracles predicts at the end of the play that Philoctetes will be healed his words suggest 
that it is the hero’s ‘sufferings’ (ponoi) that will continue to bring him fame.9 The Philoctetes also 
places onstage a prolonged representation of a man in the throes of violent physical pain. In the 
play’s second episode (the ‘third act’, in Lessing’s terminology), the principal action consists in 
the hero’s groans and cries as he struggles with the agony of his divinely inflicted wound: 
 
Philoctetes 
Ahh! Ahh! 
Neoptolemus 
 What is it? 
                 Philoctetes 
                 Nothing much, child, go on. 
 
Neoptolemus 
Are you in pain – your old illness? 
 
Philoctetes 
Oh no. I feel better now, I think – 
Gods! 
                                                          
8 Lessing 1984: 24–5/2012:30–1. 
9 See Jebb 1898 on Philoctetes 1422: ‘ek ton ponon tond’ euklea thesthai bion’: ‘ek, not merely “after” (720), but “as a 
result of,” “through.”’. 
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Neoptolemus 
Why are you groaning and calling on the gods? 
 
Philoctetes 
To come gently to me and save me –  
Ahh ahh! 
 
Neoptolemus 
Whatever’s wrong? Speak, don’t keep quiet! 
You’re clearly suffering terribly. 
 
Philoctetes 
It’s killing me, child, I can’t hide this evil 
from you, oh ohh! It’s shooting through me, 
shooting through me – oh, wretched, miserable me! 
It’s killing me, child, it’s eating me up, oh oh! 
oh oh oh ohh! oh oh oh oh oh oh oh oh oh! 
For the gods’ sake, if you have a sword, child 
take it and hack at my ankle, 
cut it off right away, come, child, don’t spare my life. 
 
S. Ph. 732–50 
These inarticulate cries of pain had, moreover, furnished the starting-point of Lessing’s criticisms 
of Winckelmann in Chapter 1 of Laocoon. There, Lessing had cited ‘The laments, the cries, the 
wild curses with which his anguish filled the camp and interrupted all the sacrifices and sacred 
rites [and which] resounded no less terribly through the desert island’ in order to launch his 
refutation of Winckelmann’s statement, illustrated by a carelessly drawn parallel between the 
marble Laocoon and the Sophoclean hero, that Greek heroism in general was characterised by 
silent endurance.10 Even before Winckelmann, Sophocles’ presentation of the suffering 
Philoctetes had already made that hero – along with the Heracles of the Trachiniae and the 
Oedipus of the Oedipus Tyrannus – into a topos of early modern debates over tragic decorum. The 
supposedly ‘simple’ and ‘natural’ speech of Sophocles’ suffering heroes was cited by critics who 
sought to move away from the conventionalised and elegant verbal and gestural expression of 
high French classical tragedy in the mode of Corneille and Racine. Fénelon, for example, had 
praised the final scene of the Oedipus in his Lettre sur les occupations de l’Académie of 1714 as 
presenting ‘Nature’s own cry as she surrenders to pain’, commending ‘the same lively, simple 
pain’ expressed by Heracles and Philoctetes. Diderot used the same examples in his Entretiens sur 
Le Fils naturel of 1757.11 By the time Lessing came to write the Laocoon both French authors had 
                                                          
10 ‘Laocoon suffers, but he suffers like the Philoctetes of Sophocles; his anguish pierces our very soul, but at the 
same time we wish that we were able to endure our suffering as well as this great man does.’ Winckelmann 1755, 
cited and discussed in Lessing 1984: 7–8/2012: 11–12. 
11 ‘C’est ainsi que parle la nature, quand elle succombe à la douleur: jamais rien ne fut plus éloigné des phrases 
brillantes du bel esprit. Hercule et Philoctète parlent avec la même douleur vive et simple dans Sophocle’ (Fénelon 
1845: 60); ‘Je ne laisserai point de crier à nos Français: la Vérité! La Nature! Les Anciens! Sophocle! Philoctete!’ 
(Diderot 1980: 116). See Burwick 1991: 42–61, Worvill 2005: 53, 82. 
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been received into German theoretical discussions: Gottsched had translated Fénelon’s dramatic 
writings in the first volume of his Deutsche Schaubuhne of 1741 and Lessing himself produced a 
two–volume translation of Diderot’s dramatic writings in 1760 under the title Das Theater des 
Herrn Diderots.12 
Aspects of Lessing’s treatment of Sophocles in Laocoon’s opening chapters are reminiscent of the 
earlier French debates. He declares that Philoctetes’ cries are ‘the natural expression of physical 
pain’ and compares the natural self–expression of Homeric heroes favourably with the restrained 
propriety of ‘we more refined Europeans of a wiser, later age’.13 The many contrasts he draws 
between Sophocles’ treatment and the contemporary Philoctète of Jean–Baptiste Chateaubrun, in 
which the ancient dramatist always comes off the better, also mark Lessing’s arguments as an 
intervention in this particular chapter of the Querelle.14 Their concern with questions of 
convention and decorum in theatrical representation also marks these chapters as a continuation 
of the theoretical discussions about tragic drama that Lessing had carried on with Mendelssohn 
and Nicolai in 1756–7. Romira Worvill has explored how the different positions advanced by the 
three correspondents in the so–called Briefwechsel über das Trauerspiel are complex, with each 
endorsing elements of both ‘progressive’ and ‘traditional’ (i.e. neoclassical) points of view.15 
While Mendelssohn’s position on the end of tragedy – that it should provide virtuous models for 
emulation – appears traditional in the face of both Nicolai’s du Bos- and de Piles-inflected claim 
that tragedy aims to arouse strong emotions and Lessing’s subordination of admiration to pity, 
his overall understanding of drama as an ensemble which combines language, gesture and staging 
to make a ‘living representation’ (‘lebendige Vorstellung’), which aims at ‘illusion’, represents a 
modernising advance on Lessing’s more conventional treatment of drama as essentially a genre 
of poetic speech.16 In Laocoon, Chapter 4, Lessing’s qualification of dramatic poetry as ‘designed 
for living representation by the actor’ (‘für die lebendige Mahlerey des Schauspielers bestimmt’) 
echoes Mendelssohn’s formulation from the Briefwechsel; his concerns with the interaction of 
Philoctetes and the other onstage characters, and with the difficulty any actor would face in 
‘carry[ing] his presentation of physical pain to the point of illusion’ (‘bis zur Illusion’) suggest that 
the terms in which he is considering drama have expanded from the heavily literary perspective 
of the Briefwechsel.17 
                                                          
12 Diderot’s dramatic theories were particularly attractive to Lessing, who viewed them as providing support and 
encouragement to the more realistic modes of language and gesture pioneered in the ‘bourgeois’ tragedy Miss Sara 
Sampson (1755) and developed further in Emilia Galotti (1772). On Diderot’s influence on Lessing’s dramaturgy see 
Nisbet 2013: 270–4 and especially Worvill 2005. 
13 ‘High as Homer raises his heroes above human nature in other respects, he still has them remain faithful to it in 
their sensitiveness to pain and injury and in the expression of this feeling by cries, tears, or invectives. In their deeds 
they are beings of a higher order, in their feelings true men.’  Lessing 1984: 8–9/2012: 12–13. 
14 Lessing 1984: 11, 25–32/2012: 14–15, 32–42. As both Nisbet (2013: 275–7) and Vollhardt (2013: 188–90) note, 
these sections derive from Lessing’s earlier and abandoned project to produce a German–language edition of 
Sophocles’ plays. Nisbet states that Lessing intended to present Sophocles as ‘a theatre reformer who overcame the 
Schwulst (bombastic or inflated style) of Aeschylus, replacing it with authentic sublimity and tragic fear with no need 
for exaggerated effects’ (2013: 276). The canonical elements of this portrait, in which Sophocles takes over certain 
characteristics from the Euripides of Aristophanes’ Frogs, should not obscure its character as a foil for Lessing’s own 
theatrical priorities. More generally on Lessing’s engagements with ancient drama (including Sophocles), see 
Korzeniewski 2003. On the Querelle des anciens et des modernes, see the introduction to this volume.  
15 Worvill 2005: 145. On the unsystematic character of the Briefwechsel, which was never intended by its authors for 
publication, see Martinec 2013:120–1. 
16 Worvill 2005: 145–56; see too Burwick 1991: 83–94. 
17 Lessing 1985: 24/2012: 31; see Worvill 2005: 163–4. 
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In numerous ways, then, the opening of Laocoon shows Lessing’s continuing concern with 
questions of dramatic language and staging. Yet such questions do not form his primary focus in 
Chapter 4. His central question there is whether a hero such as Philoctetes, whose suffering is 
primarily corporeal, makes a fit subject for tragedy; and in the passage quoted above Lessing 
suggests that an objection arises because of a theory which holds that in general, the spectacle of 
extreme physical pain is unsuited to arousing pity among the spectators. It was from precisely 
this theoretical position that Smith had criticised Greek tragic heroes in his Theory of Moral 
Sentiments: 
In some of the Greek tragedies there is an attempt to excite compassion, by the 
representation of the agonies of bodily pain. Philoctetes cries out and faints from the 
extremity of his sufferings. Hippolytus and Hercules are both introduced as expiring 
under the severest tortures, which, it seems, even the fortitude of Hercules was incapable 
of supporting… These attempts to excite compassion by the representation of bodily 
pain, may be regarded as among the greatest breaches of decorum of which the Greek 
theatre has set the example.18   
     
And it is as the proponent of this view that Lessing quotes directly from Smith shortly 
afterwards: 
... [L]et us turn to those scenes in which Philoctetes no longer appears as the abandoned 
sick man, but has hopes of leaving the bleak desert island and returning to his kingdom; 
that is to say, in those scenes where his entire misfortune is restricted to his painful 
wound. He moans, he shrieks, he falls into the most horrible convulsions. It is against 
this that the objection of offended decorum is justly raised; it is an Englishman [i.e. 
Smith] who makes the objection – a man, therefore, not readily suspected of false 
delicacy. And as indicated, he gives very good reasons for his objection. All feelings and 
passions, he says, for which others can find but little sympathy become offensive if too 
violently expressed. “For this reason nothing is more indecent and unmanly than 
weeping and crying out with physical pain however intolerable it may be. But there is, to 
be sure, a sympathy for physical pain. When we see that someone is about to receive a 
blow on his arm or shin, we naturally start and draw back our own arm or leg, and if the 
blow actually falls, we too feel it in some measure and are hurt by it as well as the 
sufferer. However, our actual pain is very slight, and so when the person who is struck 
cries out violently we are invariably contemptuous of him since we are not able to cry as 
violently as he.”19  
Lessing’s statement that it is here that a substantive objection on grounds of decency may be raised 
(‘Hierwider gehet eigentlich der Einwurf des beleidigten Anstandes’, emphasis mine) distinguishes 
the ethical objection of ‘der Engländer’ from the ‘falsche Delicatesse’ of neoclassical French 
critics.20 Rather than the traditional question of the register of tragic language, it is the more 
                                                          
18 Smith 2002: 37 (TMS I.ii.I.11). 
19 Lessing 1985: 27–8/2012: 37–8, quoting TMS I.ii.I.5 (Lessing uses the second edition of 1761).   
20 See too Lessing’s distinction between ‘a merely conventional sense of propriety’ and ‘one that is grounded in the 
very nature of our feelings' in the first passage from Chapter 4 quoted in this section (1985: 24–5/2012: 31). The 
distinction between a sense of propriety that is ‘bloß willkürlich‘ and one that is ,in dem Wesen unsrer 
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specifically Smithian question of the fitness of spectacles of physical suffering to arouse 
sympathy with which Lessing is concerned.  
Lessing will, of course, disagree with Smith on the success of the Philoctetes as tragedy: he goes on 
to claim that Sophocles’ play is one of the ‘masterpieces of the stage’.21 But although Lessing 
disagrees with Smith overall it is remarkable how many of Smith’s criticisms he adopts. Lessing’s 
defence of Sophocles reveals him to have been a careful reader of Smith and who was willing to 
concede many points of Smith’s argument. The next section of this paper sets out why Smith 
held that violent expressions of bodily suffering were offensive. It then examines Lessing’s 
counter–arguments in order to show how many points of Smith’s criticisms are taken over in 
Lessing’s response.  
SMITH’S ARGUMENTS ABOUT SYMPATHY AND LESSING’S REPLY 
It is unsurprising that Lessing should have proved an enthusiastic reader of Adam Smith’s Theory 
of Moral Sentiments. The work was first published in 1759, three years after the appearance of 
Lessing’s translation of Hutcheson’s System of Moral Philosophy and the aforementioned 
correspondence with Nicolai and Mendelssohn, in which Lessing had defended the position that 
the proper end of tragedy was to increase its audience’s moral sensitivity by exercising their 
capacity for pity.22 The Theory of Moral Sentiments would have interested Lessing for at least two 
reasons. First, it provides an extended and highly insightful exploration of the nature and 
workings of pity. Smith’s starting–point is ‘pity or compassion, the emotion which we feel for 
the misery of others when we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a lively manner’; once 
this is extended into an analysis of ‘sympathy’ – a term Smith introduces ‘to denote our fellow–
feeling with any passion whatever’ – it is fundamental to his theories of moral approbation and 
judgement.23 Second, Smith was as interested as Lessing in the question of the contribution of 
sympathy to harmonious moral and social co–existence. For Smith, ‘to feel much for others and 
little for ourselves, to restrain our selfish, and to indulge our benevolent affections, constitutes 
the perfection of human nature; and can alone produce among mankind that harmony of 
sentiments and passions in which consists their whole grace and propriety’.24 Smith is, however, 
little concerned with aesthetic questions per se. He brings up the Philoctetes as an illustration within 
a more general argument about how moral approbation functions. His objection to Philoctetes 
stems from two aspects of his moral psychology: his claim that sympathy involves an act of 
                                                          
Empfindungen selbst gegründet‘ corresponds to the distinction between neoclassical French critics of Sophocles 
and Smith. 
21 Lessing 1985: 25/2012: 31. 
22 Martinec 2008 doubts Lessing’s authorship of the Hutcheson translation.  
23 Smith 2002: 11, 13 (TMS I.i.I.1, 5). 
24 Smith 2002: 30 (TMS I.i.V.5). There are further reasons why Smith might have proved attractive to Lessing as he 
continued to develop his thoughts on the nature of pity and its role in aesthetic response. Smith appears usefully 
indifferent to the debates over nature and culture which had governed discussions of sympathy up to this point. 
TMS begins in medias res, with the claim that ‘How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some 
principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, 
though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it’. Smith thus eschews the question of the origin of 
sympathy in favour of a close and subtle description of its operations: a pragmatic and inductive mode of 
proceeding which may have appealed to Lessing the dramatist and critic.  Smith also praises moderation in the 
expression of passions while disapproving of extreme Stoic fortitude: a position which accords to some extent with 
Lessing’s dramatic theory and practice. See Heidsieck 1983. 
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simulative imagination, and the distinction he draws between the ‘passions which take their 
origin from the body’ and those which depend on the imagination.  
On the first of these topics, it is illuminating to draw a contrast between Smith and his friend and 
philosophical correspondent, David Hume. In his Treatise of Human Nature, Hume had put 
forward a conception of sympathy as working via the transfer or ‘communication’ of passions 
from one agent to another.25 Smith, by contrast, holds that insofar as human beings can come to 
feel the emotions of others it is by dint of their ability to imagine themselves in the other’s 
position – what he calls ‘changing places in fancy with the sufferer’.26 Thus, in the extended 
example of ‘our brother on the rack’, with which Smith opens his discussion in TMS, he insists 
that  
as long as we ourselves are at our ease, our senses will never inform us of what he 
suffers. They never did, and never can, carry us beyond our own person, and it is by the 
imagination only that we can form any conception of what are his sensations.27 
This emphasis on the role of imagination and the consequent importance of the ‘vivacity or 
dulness of the conception’ an agent is able to form of another’s distress aligns Smith’s discussion 
more easily than Hume’s with the outlook of German rationalist aesthetics, which is similarly 
concerned with questions of the clarity of mental representations.28 But Smith also argues that it 
is easier to perform such acts of the imagination in some cases than in others. In instances of 
physical pain, for example, or hunger, where the ‘passion’ observed is of a kind ‘which arise from 
a certain situation or disposition of the body’, he maintains that observers, ‘not being in the same 
disposition, cannot be expected to sympathise with them’. The imagination, however, ‘is more 
ductile, and more readily assumes... the shape and configuration of the imaginations of those 
with whom I am familiar.’ If, therefore, an observer witnesses another’s fear, say, or 
‘disappointment in love, or ambition’, sympathy flows more readily. 29  
We might well question the grounds for this distinction – is it really so much harder to 
sympathize with another’s hunger, say, than their fear? Smith’s illustrations are indeed hedged 
around with qualifications.  In the passage Lessing quotes, Smith’s claim that ‘nothing is more 
indecent and unmanly than weeping and crying out with physical pain however intolerable it may 
be’ is followed immediately by a reservation: 
There is, however, a good deal of sympathy even with bodily pain. If, as has already been 
observed, I see a stroke aimed, and just ready to fall upon the leg, or arm, of another 
person, I naturally shrink and draw back my own leg, or my own arm: and when it does 
fall, I feel it in some measure, and am hurt by it as well as the sufferer. My hurt, however, 
                                                          
25 ‘A chearful countenance infuses a sensible complacency and serenity into my mind; as an angry or sorrowful one 
throws a sudden damp upon me. Hatred, resentment, esteem, love, courage, mirth and melancholy; all these 
passions I feel more from communication than from my own natural temper and disposition.’ (Hume 1978: 317). 
The detailed debate over the mechanisms of sympathetic communication according to the Humean psychology of 
ideas and impressions falls outside the scope of this paper.  
26 Smith 2002: 12 (TMS I.i.I.3). 
27 Smith 2002: 11 (TMS I.i.I.2). 
28 Nisbet 2013: 316–8, Wellbery 1984: 9–42. 
29 Smith 2002: 35 (TMS I.ii.I.6). 
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is, no doubt, excessively slight, and, upon that account, if he makes any violent out-cry, 
as I cannot go along with him, I cannot fail to despise him.30  
Lessing’s discussion shows him to have a fairly fine grasp of the niceties of Smith’s psychology. 
Significantly, his ‘defence’ of Sophocles here falls far short of a refutation of Smith’s views. 
Lessing makes four arguments in defence of the propriety of Sophocles’ handling of his hero’s 
physical suffering. In three of them he defends the Philoctetes not on the grounds of spectacles of 
extreme physical pain’s intrinsic suitability to arouse a theatre audience’s sympathy, but in terms 
of how Sophocles has managed to overcome this weakness inherent in his chosen theme.  
Lessing directs our attention first to the skill with which Sophocles has ‘enlarged and extended’ 
the idea of Philoctetes’ physical pain. He did so by making the subject of his play a hero who had 
been wounded, rather than afflicted by some less obvious disease, ‘because sickness, no matter 
how painful, cannot impress us as much as a wound’.31 Far from providing a refutation of Smith 
this is almost a quotation, for Smith had maintained that: ‘We conceive in a much more likely 
and distinct manner, the pain which proceeds from an external cause, than we do that which 
arises from an internal disorder. I can scarce form an idea of the agonies of my neighbour when 
he is tortured with the gout, or the stone; but I have the clearest conception of what he must 
suffer from an incision, a wound, or a fracture.’32  
Lessing’s second point is likewise very close to something Smith himself says.  
However great and terrible he made the physical pain of his hero, Sophocles still knew 
full well that it was in itself not enough to excite any appreciable degree of pity. He 
therefore combined it with other ills which likewise could not in themselves greatly move 
us, but which receive from this combination a coloring just as melancholy as that to 
which they in their turn impart to physical pain. These ills were complete isolation from 
human society, hunger, and all the hardships of life to which one is exposed in a state of 
privation and in a raw climate.33 
Here Lessing emphasises Sophocles’ brilliance in combining Philoctetes’ physical degradation 
with other deprivations which, considered together with his wound, render him pitiful. Some of 
these (‘hunger’) are likewise pains of the body, while others, such as the loneliness attendant 
upon ‘complete isolation from human society’ are what Smith would have termed pains of the 
imagination. Yet Smith too had suggested that ‘It is not the sore foot, but the solitude, of 
Philoctetes which affects us, and diffuses over that charming tragedy, that romantic wildness, 
which is so agreeable to the imagination’. Lessing does place the balance a little more evenly, 
suggesting that the challenges of isolation alone would create a Robinson Crusoe figure, rather 
than a spectacle of pity. This does not significantly affect the overall point that, as Smith puts it, 
‘In all these cases... it is not the pain which interests us, but some other circumstance.’ 34  
                                                          
30 Smith 2002: 35 (TMS I.ii.I.5). This is the text of the first edition; Smith’s wording changes slightly in subsequent 
editions. 
31 Lessing 1985: 25/2012: 31–2. 
32 Smith 2002: 36–7 (TMS I.ii.I.10).  
33 Lessing 1985: 26/2012:32–3. 
34 Smith 2002: 37 (TMS I.ii.I.11).   
Last edited 24 August 2016 
 
10 
 
Even the fourth point of Lessing’s defence does little to take up the argument where it would 
need to be taken up to counter Smith: the idea that witnessing Philoctetes’ physical suffering 
would in and of itself prompt a sympathetic reaction from the spectators: 
Sophocles was not content simply to secure his sensitive Philoctetes from all contempt: 
he has at the same time forestalled all adverse criticism based on the remarks of the 
Englishman. For though we are not always contemptuous of the man who cries out 
under physical pain, it is an indisputable fact that we do not feel as much pity for him as 
his cry would seem to demand. How then should those who are with the screaming 
Philoctetes conduct themselves? Should they pretend to be deeply moved? That would 
be contrary to nature. Should they appear cold and embarrassed, as one actually tends to 
be in such a situation? That would create a most unpleasant dissonance in the mind of 
the spectator.35  
Note first the Smithian: even if the spectators do not utterly despise a hero who gives full 
expression to his physical suffering, their sympathy is unlikely to be commensurate with his 
expression of feelings. Their enjoyment of the play will therefore interrupted by ‘a most 
unpleasant dissonance’, as they disapprove of the lack of self-control that has led to him rolling 
and writhing around the stage. Lessing argues that Sophocles averts this possibility by creating 
other points of interest for his audience: their attention is held by the moral dilemma facing 
Neoptolemus (who must decide whether or not to take advantage of Philoctetes’ incapacity to 
make off with his bow) and the reversal to come.36 This again amounts to arguing that the 
audience is diverted from the problematic spectacle of Philoctetes’ corporeal suffering, rather 
than defending it as a sight itself suited to arousing pity. 
It is Lessing’s third argument that is the most interesting, and provides his most substantial 
response to Smith’s censures. Immediately following his long and apparently concessive 
quotation of Smith, he comments: 
Nothing is more deceptive than the laying down of general laws for our emotions. Their 
texture is so delicate and intricate that even the most cautious speculation can hardly pick 
out a single thread and follow it through all its interlacing. But even if such speculation 
were to succeed, what could we gain by it? In nature there are no single, unmixed 
emotions; with each one thousands of others spring up at the same time, and the least of 
these is able to change the original feeling completely, so that one exception after another 
arises until the supposedly general law itself is finally reduced to a mere personal 
experience in some individual cases. We despise a man, says the Englishman, whom we 
hear cry out violently under physical pain. But not always; not the first time; not when we 
see that the sufferer is making every effort to suppress it; not when we know him to be a 
man of firmness in other respects; and less when we see him offer proofs of his 
steadfastness even while suffering; when we see that his pain can force him to cry out but 
not go one single step further than that; when we see that he would rather submit to a 
continuation of his pain than change his way of thinking or his resolve in the slightest 
                                                          
35 Lessing 1985: 30/2012: 40. 
36 Lessing 1985: 30–1/2012: 40–1.  
Last edited 24 August 2016 
 
11 
 
degree, even though he knows that such a change would end suffering altogether. We 
find all this in the case of Philoctetes.37  
This passage should be sufficient to temper any interpretation of Lessing in Laocoon as despising 
endurance and fortitude in the tragic hero. Despite Chapter 1’s blunt statement that ‘Stoicism is 
not dramatic’ (‘Alles Stoische ist untheatralisch’), and the distaste for the cold, Senecan tragedy of 
admiration displayed in Chapter 4, Lessing praises Sophocles’ Philoctetes for his ‘steadfastness’ 
(‘Standhaftigkeit’) and for making the greatest possible effort to stifle his pain.38  Lessing’s claim 
that no ‘single’ (‘einzeln’) and ‘unadulterated’ (‘rein’) emotions occur in nature recalls the 
December 1756 letter to Mendelssohn in which he had outlined a view of tragic pity as a hybrid 
emotion that combines admiration for a hero’s perfections and pain at his misfortunes.39 This 
section of Lessing’s argument testifies yet again to his continuing concern with the arguments 
about tragedy’s emotional and ethical effects worked out in the 1756–7 correspondence on 
tragedy.  
But it also reveals an element in Lessing’s thinking about the workings of tragic pity which is 
significant in the light of his direction of argument in Laocoon’s second half. For, although 
Lessing appears in this passage to insist on the instantaneous (‘zugleich’) occurrence of the varied 
emotions that go to make up the audience’s overall response, his analysis of how the theatre 
audience comes to sympathize with Philoctetes’ suffering invokes their appreciation of the 
characteristic actions and passions of the hero as they have developed across the play’s preceding 
episodes. The sympathy the spectators feel for Philoctetes as he writhes in agony is a response to 
the situation he is in at that moment: extreme physical pain, so great that he can no longer stifle 
its expression. But they respond with sympathy, rather than (as Smith might predict) contempt, 
because of their enlarged understanding of the character and situation of the man who is 
suffering such agonies before their very eyes. They react to Philoctetes not simply as a man in 
the throes of pain, but as this particular hero in his unique predicament, who has endured what 
Philoctetes has endured and is still subject to a terrible deception. In short, Lessing suggests that 
the audience’s sympathetic response to Philoctetes’ sufferings is dependent upon the kind of 
narrative understanding of action over time which, Lessing suggests elsewhere in the Laocoon, is 
the province of the poet rather than the visual artist.   
Some comments Smith makes about sympathy show the potential for his analysis to be 
developed in this direction. In the course of his gentle correction of Hume’s discussion of 
sympathy’s workings he goes so far as to state that ‘Sympathy... does not arise so much from the 
view of the passion, as from that of the situation which excites it.’40 This ‘view of… the situation’ 
is particularly important in the case of what Smith terms the ‘unsocial passions’, such as anger 
                                                          
37 Lessing 1985: 28–9/2012: 38. 
38 Lessing 1985: 11, 29–30/2012: 15, 38. 
39 ‘Ein großes Mitleiden kann nicht ohne große Vollkommenheiten in dem Gegenstande des Mitleids sein, und 
große Vollkommenheiten, sinnlich ausgedrückt, nicht ohne Bewunderung. Aber diese großen Vollkommenheiten 
sollen in dem Trauerspiele nie ohne große Unglücksfälle sein, sollen mit diesen allezeit genau verbunden sein, und 
sollen also nicht Bewunderung allein, sondern Bewunderung und Schmerz, das ist, Mitleiden erwecken. Und das ist 
meine Meinung. Die Bewunderung findet also in dem Trauerspiele nicht als ein besonderer Affekt Statt, sondern 
bloß als die Hälfte des Mitleids’ (Lessing to Mendelssohn, 18 December 1756, in Lessing 1972: 77). Lessing would 
return to the elaboration of tragic pity as a ‘vermischte Empfindung’ in numbers 74–78 of the Hamburgische 
Dramaturgie. See Lessing 1999: 378–402, see especially 381–2. 
40 Smith 2002: 15 (TMS I.i.I.10). 
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and hatred, where the immediate sympathy of a spectator who has not been informed of all the 
facts of the case might flow towards the object, rather than the agent, of the negative emotion.41 
In Chapter 4 of Laocoon Lessing extends this insight in a manner that implicitly favours poetry 
over painting. For the extended elaboration of context that Sophocles’ dramatic masterpiece as a 
whole provides can transform a particular moment or episode of behaviour which, considered by 
itself, may seem improper into one element of a more complex and sympathetic overall response 
to the suffering hero.  
STRUCTURE, NOT SPECTACLE: THE CONTINUING AUTHORITY OF ARISTOTLE 
The essential elements of Lessing’s response to Smith are therefore already presented in the 
words he uses to describe the ‘province’ of poetry at the start of Chapter 4:  
‘[T]here is nothing to compel the poet to compress his picture into a single moment. He 
may, if he so chooses, take up each action at its origin and pursue it through all possible 
variations to its end. Each variation which would cost the artist a separate work costs the 
poet but a single pen stroke; and if the result of this pen stroke, viewed by itself, should 
offend the hearer’s imagination, it was either anticipated by what has preceded or is so 
softened and compensated by what follows that it loses its individual impression and in 
combination achieves the best effect in the world.42  
 
It is poetry’s ability to present complex actions extending over time that allows the audience to 
respond to Philoctetes not as a contemptible coward but as a steadfastly suffering hero. In this 
manner, the ‘disordered’ musings on tragedy with which Lessing opens Laocoon both anticipate 
and confirm the analytical–deductive presentation of the essay’s second half.  
This understanding of poetic action as consisting in a temporally extended but unified complex 
of individual moments is, however, a more developed notion than the abstract characterisation 
with which Lessing opens his deductive presentation. Several commentators have explored how 
Chapter 16’s definition of actions as ‘Objects or parts of objects which follow one another [in 
time]’ (‘Gegenstände, die auf einander, oder deren Theile auf einander folgen’) fails to do justice 
to the causally connected sequences of individual movements (Pandarus’ stringing of his bow, 
Hebe’s yoking of horses to Hera’s chariot) Lessing gives as examples of ‘actions’ in the 
paragraphs that follow, nor even to the distinction between ‘progressive’ and ‘stationary’ actions 
contemplated and set aside at the end of the preceding chapter.43 As Daniel Fulda discusses in 
this volume, passages from Lessing’s drafts for Laocoon reveal him at one point to have been 
working with what Fulda terms a ‘richer’ notion of action than we find in the published version 
of Chapter 16. At an analogous point of argument in a draft from 1763, Lessing defines an 
action as ‘a series of movements that aim at a final purpose’ (‘Eine Reihe von Bewegungen, die 
auf einen Endzweck abzielen, heißet eine Handlung’); a later draft talks of ‘the ideal of [poetic] 
                                                          
41 Smith 2002: 42–7 (TMS I.ii.III). 
42 Lessing 1984: 24–5/2012: 29–30. 
43 In addition to Fulda in this volume, see Rudowski 1967, Wessell 1984, Nisbet 2013: 319–20. 
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action’ as consisting in ‘1) the compression of time 2) the heightening of incitements and the 
exclusion of chance; and 3) the arousal of passions’.44  
Fulda notes that this conception of an action ‘relies heavily on Aristotle’s requirements for 
dramatic action’. Lessing’s strictures as to the length, perspicuity of causal connection, and 
emotional effect of an ideal poetic action indeed echo key features of Aristotle’s stipulations for 
the construction of tragic plots in Poetics VI–XI. In Aristotle’s discussion, however, the first two 
conditions are emphasized for the sake of the third. Tragic plots should be restricted in 
magnitude and should present a clearly connected sequence of events because by doing so they 
will provide the clearest possible representation of the kind of transformation ‘from bad fortune 
to good fortune, or from good to bad’ that Aristotle holds to be optimal for the arousal of the 
properly tragic emotions of pity and fear: 
To define the matter simply: that magnitude long enough to allow for a transformation 
from good fortune to bad fortune or bad to good, in a sequence of events that follow on 
from each other in accordance with probability or necessity, is a sufficient limit of 
magnitude.45  
Insofar as Lessing’s adoption of Aristotelian formal restrictions in this draft of Laocoon is 
sensitive to the reasoning behind Aristotle’s prescriptions, these sections suggest that his 
enumeration of the ideal formal characteristics of poetic representations of actions is also framed 
by a concern with how to achieve tragedy’s proper emotional effect.  
Even if such a concern is detectable in Lessing’s early drafts, this does not exclude the possibility 
that such questions had ceased to matter to him by the time he published Part 1 of Laocoon. 
Although the slightly later Hamburgische Dramaturgie attests to Lessing’s continuing concern to 
erect his defence of a tragedy of pity on Aristotelian foundations, his principal focus there is the 
contested notion of catharsis rather than the Aristotelian discussion of plot. There is, however, 
one further piece of evidence to suggest that the Aristotelian understanding of tragic action 
continued to occupy Lessing’s thoughts.  In the May 1769 letter to Nicolai in which he outlines 
Laocoon’s intended continuation, he again invokes the authority of the Poetics. Just after naming 
drama ‘the highest kind of poetry’ because it ‘turns the arbitrary signs wholly into natural signs’, 
he comments: 
                                                          
44 Lessing 1990: 251, 260 (Drafts 5 and 8 in the standard numbering of the Paralipomena); see section V of Fulda in 
this volume. For a concise reconstruction of Laocoon’s genesis, see Nisbet 2013: 304–06. 
45 Arist. Po. VII, 1451a11–15 Chapter VII. Aristotle justifies the preference for a plot that provokes pity and fear 
through a transformation or variation (‘metabasis/metabole/metaballein’) which arises from the structure of events, 
rather than through chance or mere spectacle, in Chapters IX and XIII–XIV. Note Lessing’s similar emphasis on 
transformation or ‘variation’ in action (‘Abänderung’) in passage from the beginning of Laocoon, Chapter 4 quoted at 
the start of this section.In their respective commentaries on the paralipomena to Laocoon, neither Barner nor 
Vollhardt observes how far Lessing’s discussion in this section (VIII) of Draft 8 is reminiscent of Poetics VII. In that 
chapter, Aristotle draws on an analogy between the well–constructed plot and the visible beauty of a physical object 
(animal or artefact) to argue that both manifest appropriate principles of magnitude and order in the arrangements 
of parts. In the case of the physical object this magnitude and order are spatial, but in the tragic plot (so Aristotle 
implies) they are temporal (1450b33–1451a15). In Paralipomena 8.VIII, Lessing likewise appeals to an analogy 
between ‘Schönheit’ as ‘der malerische Wert der Körper’ and ‘das Ideal der moralischen Vollkommenheit in der 
Poesie’ (1990: 260). The mention of ‘moralische Vollkommenheit’ suggests moreover that Lessing’s description of 
the ideal form of poetic action is (like Aristotle’s) informed by concern with its ethical effects.  
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Aristotle already declared that dramatic poetry is the highest, indeed the only poetry, and 
he puts epic poetry into second place only insofar as it is, or can be, to a large extent 
dramatic. The reason he gives for this is not mine, it is true; but it can be reduced to 
mine, and only reducing it to mine ensures it against being applied falsely.46 
Commentary on this letter has tended to focus upon what Lessing says about the media of 
dramatic representation (‘natural signs of arbitrary things’), attempting to elucidate his comments 
by reference to the concept of a ‘suitable relation’ introduced to motivate the move from 
medium to object of representation in Laocoon, Chapter 16.47 Yet if Lessing’s sole intention in the 
envisaged continuation were to elaborate a formal semiotics of drama by comparison with other 
genres of poetry, his reference to Aristotle here would be puzzling. For, although the Poetics does 
include observations about the media (speech, rhythm, melody) and modes (narration versus 
dramatic impersonation) employed by various genres of poetry, these are given a lower priority 
than plot and in any case prove insufficient to distinguish tragedy from Homeric epic.48 It is in 
relation to the construction of plot – the feature he terms ‘the beginning and soul’ of poetic 
mimesis – that Aristotle commends epic only insofar as it approximates the character of drama: 
that is, insofar as it is constructed ‘around a single, whole and complete action, with a beginning, 
middle and end, so that, like a single, whole living thing, it may produce its proper pleasure’.49 
Yet again, apparently formal restrictions concerning the unity and connection of poetic action 
are framed by the overall question of how forms such as tragedy or epic bring about their 
emotional effects. 
It is hardly surprising that Lessing, who wrote from a dramatist’s perspective and was steeped in 
both ancient and modern poetic theory, should have brought a detailed engagement with 
Sophocles and Aristotle to bear in responding to Smith’s criticisms. His claim that the poet’s 
currency of temporally extended action enables him to soften and modify the negative 
impressions of the moment provides a genuine addition to Smith’s theorising on sympathy as a 
moral sentiment. As we have seen, it also provides a bridge between the Laocoon’s famous formal 
distinctions and Lessing’s earlier and later explicit concern with the dynamics of tragic pity. For 
pity as aroused by dramatic representations of action is reliant upon structure that is progressive 
in time.50 
 
                                                          
46 Lessing to Nicolai, 26 May 1769, in Lessing 1987: 610/Nisbet 1985: 134.  
47 See for example Wellbery 1984: 226–7; Beiser 2011: 275–7; Nisbet 2013: 325–6, and Lifschitz’s chapter in this 
book. 
48 Arist. Po. III, 1448a18–23; see too IV, 1448b33–1449a1; XXIV, 1460a5–11. 
49 Arist. Po. XXIII, 1459a16–20. On the analogy between a poem and a living thing (zoōn), which refers back to the 
analogy between poetry and physical objects drawn at 1450b33–1451a15, see n. 45 above. 
50 In addition to the conference discussions in Göttingen, the argument of this paper is informed by an 
understanding of historical and philosophical debates about sympathy developed over meetings of the 
Interdisciplinary Network on Sympathy/Empathy and Imagination. Thanks are owed to my INSEI collaborators 
and to the British Academy and Leverhulme Trust for funding this network. I also thank seminar audiences in 
London and Oxford who listened to early drafts, and Avi Lifschitz and Michael Squire for inviting me to contribute 
to the conference and volume.  
